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COMMENTS
GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES OF INTEREST-FREE
LOANS BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The recently decided case of Crown v. Commissioner reinforced
the tax court's position that imputed interest on an interest-free loan is
not a taxable gift. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) continues to
take the contrary position that interest-free loans do constitute gifts of
an amount equal to the interest charge that it usually made for the use
of that amount of money.
The IRS position on the taxation of interest-free loans is consistent
with both economic reality and gift tax principles. An examination of
the economic substance of interest-free loans highlights the court's
reliance on the form of the transaction. The right to the use of money
and other property is a valuable property interest, and when no charge
is made for the transfer of this property interest there is a transfer for
less than adequate consideration. This constitutes a gift.
Because courts are reluctant to interfere in intrafamily loans, the
decisions emphasize the formal and procedural difficulties involved in
the treatment of interest-free loans as gifts. The absence of a contractual obligation to pay interest is not always a bar to finding a gift
under the tax laws, and even a demand note can be valued consistently
with gift tax principles. Because some courts will not independently
relinquish their "form over substance" reasoning, this Comment proposes that legislative direction is needed to assure that interest-free
loans are consistently treated as gift taxable events.

II.
A.

THE GIFT TAXATION OF INTEREST-FREE LOANS

The Johnson Decision

Johnson v. United States' dealt with interest-free loans between
family members. The taxpayer made several interest-free loans to his
children between 1956 and 1962, the outstanding balance of these
loans never amounting to less than $200,000 at the end of each tax
year. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer had made a gift in the amount
of the imputed interest on the loans, but the court disagreed, primarily
because of the absence of a contractual or statutory obligation to pay
1. No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Sept. 19, 1978). All references to the Crown court are to
the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals unless otherwise indicated.
2. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
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contract, and the court found that
the loan to be interest-free there was
emphasized that when parents loan
no legal requirement that they must

The Crown Decision

The seventh circuit in Crown v. Commissioner,"affirming the tax
court, refused to find a gift in another series of interest-free loans from
a parent to his children. Areljay Company, owned by Lester Crown
and his two brothers, made approximately eighteen million dollars in
loans to twenty-four trusts established for the benefit of the owners'
children and close relatives. About thirteen percent of the indebtedness
was represented by demand notes, and the rest was open account
loans. 5 No provision was made for any interest on these loans. The
IRS estimated the interest which the Crown brothers' company could
have charged at six percent of the principal, and allocated one-third of
this gift to Lester Crown. The tax court,' following the rationale of
Johnson, refused to find a gift of the imputed interest.
On appeal, the seventh circuit affirmed the tax court decision,
emphasizing the difficulty of evaluating demand loans. The IRS
argued that the major purpose of the gift tax statutes is to protect the
income and estate taxes.7 Permitting interest-free loans to escape the
gift tax permits a transfer of income that escapes income taxation at a
higher rate and is not subject to gift taxation. The court observed that
both demand and term loans effectuated a shift of income from parent
to child by allowing the income earned by the principal to be taxed to
the child at a lower rate.I
The IRS also argued that interest-free loans reduce the taxpayer's
estate and permit him at the same time to escape wealth transfer taxation if the reduction is not subjected to the gift tax. The court admitted, looking at the note as an asset of a decedent's estate, that a term
loan could result in an untaxed reduction in the taxpayer's estate. The
reduction is the difference between the present discounted value of the
note and its face value. But because a demand note presumptively has
3. "The right to interest must arise from an express or implied contractual
obligation or from statute." Id. at 77.
4. No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Sept. 19, 1978).
5. The court did not distinguish between the two types of loans in its analysis.

Id.
6. Crown v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977). The IRS published its nonacquiescence in this decision. 1978-27 I.R.B. 6.
7. No. 77-1898, slip op. at 3.
8. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/5
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a value equal to its face, the court saw no equivalent reduction in the
estate. 9 The IRS also argued that the loan reduced the taxpayer's
future estate because the taxpayer was prevented from investing the

loaned money in income-producing assets. The court rejected this
argument, saying that the purpose of the estate tax is not to protect the
taxpayer's potential estate 0 by insuring that its assets were utilized to
their fullest income-producing capacity.
The court said that it is doubtful whether a property interest which
could be terminated by another at any time, such as the use of money
under a demand note, could be characterized as a property interest suf-

ficient to qualify as a gift.'I The IRS's argument that the gift consisted
of the value of the forbearance to call the loan was rejected by the

court because of the absence of a preexisting contractual or statutory
2
obligation. '
Thus, there are two principle barriers to gift taxation of imputed

interest on interest-free loans in the seventh circuit: (1) The absence of
a preexisting contractual obligation to pay interest; and (2) the valuation problem in ascertaining the benefit to the borrower of a loan
which can be called in at any moment.
III.

THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE OF THE TRANSACTION

In holding against the Commissioner, the courts are employing a
"form over substance" argument which has been overwhelmingly
criticized by legal commentators. 3 When money is transferred without
an interest charge, the substance of the transaction is that a benefit is
being transferred gratuitously. The value of that benefit is not
diminished by technical differences in the form of the note given for
the loan, or by the absence of a contractual agreement to pay interest.
An examination of other federal gift and income tax provisions"
9.

Id. at 3-4. This discussion assumes the note is outstanding at the time of the

taxpayer's death. See Tidwell, Lester Crown Points the Way to Estate Tax Reduction
Under the 1976 Tax Reform Act, 55 TAXES 651 (1977).
10. No. 77-1898, slip op. at 4-5.
11. Id. at 9-10.
12. Id. at 12.
13. Comment, Interest-Free Loans and the Gift Tax: Crown v. Comm'r, 38
OHIO ST. L.J. 903 (1977); Schlifke, Taxing as Income the Receipt of Interest-Free
Loans, 33 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 346 (1968); 65 MICH. L. REV. 1014 (1967); 19 STAN. L.
REV. 870 (1967); but see 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 150 (1978).
14. This comment considers cases and statutes in both the gift tax and the income
tax areas. The income tax provisions and the gift tax provisions are separate bodies of
law and are not to be read in pan materia. See, e.g., Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Comm'r, 160
F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947). Nevertheless, certain underlying economic concepts and the
policy against tax avoidance are consistent throughout federal taxation and provide a
strong basis for analogy among sections dealing with similar issues.
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shows, first, that the right to use property such as money is a valuable
property right. Secondly, this examination shows that when a property
right is transferred without corresponding compensation, the transfer
is not for full and adequate consideration, and is generally a gift.
A.

The Use of Money as a Property Interest

For income tax purposes, courts have recognized that a benefit is
conferred upon a taxpayer who uses another's property free of charge,
whether or not there is a contractual obligation for the payment of the
use of the property.' 5 Courts have consistently held that where corporations allow shareholders or officers the use of property rent-free,
the fair rental value is taxable to the recipient as income under Internal
16
Revenue Code, section 61(a). Although the willingness to recognize
income may be partly explained by the broadly inclusive statutory
language in section 61,'" the income taxation of the right to use property as a transfer of economic value can provide a helpful analogy for
gift tax treatment.
The treatment of a shareholder's use of the corporation's property
without paying rent sharply contrasts with the treatment of a
shareholder's use of the corporation's money without paying interest.
8
In J. Simpson Dean v. Commissioner,' the taxpayer obtained loans
from his controlled corporation in exchange for noninterest-bearing
notes. The IRS charged the taxpayer with gross income equal to the
amount of the interest that he would have had to pay on the loan in an
arm's length transaction. The court refused to uphold the assessment,
distinguishing between the rent-free use of property and the interestfree use of money. It said that if the taxpayer had paid interest on the
loan, he would have been able to deduct the expense under section
163(a).' 9 Therefore, if it imputed income for the interest he should
have paid, it should also impute a deduction he could have taken. It
would be as if the taxpayer received the amount of interest as income
from the corporation, then paid it back to the corporation as interest
for the use of the money loaned. Because any imputed income would
15. See, e.g., 58th St. Plaza Theatre v. Comm'r, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1952); Int'l
Artists Ltd. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 94 (1970); Challenge Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.
650 (1962).
16. I.R.C. § 61(a). All "section" citations in the text are to the Internal Revenue
Code unless otherwise indicated.
17. "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived .

. . ."

Id.

18. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). The tax court's decision in Crown cited to Dean for the
proposition that courts refuse to tax non-interest bearing loans under either income or
gift tax laws. 67 T.C. at 1064.
19. I.R.C. § 163(a).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/5
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be offset by an interest deduction, it would be futile to impute income

at all. Rent, however, is a nondeductible personal expense. 0 Therefore, there is no equivalent offsetting deduction for the imputed income from the use of this type of property.
The Dean court reasoning is not soundly based on Code interpreta-

tion. Under income tax principles, income and deductions are entirely
separate concepts, and the existence of income is not negated by the

existence of a corresponding deduction of equal amount." Therefore,
the predication of income on the nonexistence of an offsetting deduction, as the tax court did, is erroneous. Deductions are enactments of
legislative grace;" the section providing for an interest deduction was
the result of a Congressional policy decision and has no direct implica-

tions for the treatment of income.
There are additional problems with the Dean analysis. First, if a
taxpayer does not elect to itemize deductions on his income tax return,

he may be unable to utilize the deduction for interest paid." Second,
all interest payments are not deductible."
Dean also relied on a revenue ruling dealing with "split dollar"
insurance agreements that is no longer in effect. 5 The ruling compared
payments made by employers toward their employees' life insurance

policies to interest-free loans, but said that "[t]he mere making
available of money does not result in realized income to the payee or a
deduction to the payor." 26 Since the IRS's present position is directly
20. I.R.C. § 262.
21. Section 61(a) does not provide that items are to be included in gross income
only when there is no offsetting deduction.
22. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
23. I.R.C. § 63(g) (1977). The interest, if business related, may be deducted in
computing gross income even if zero bracket tax is selected. I.R.C. § 162 (1976).
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 265(2) (1976). The concurring and dissenting opinions in
Dean pointed out that the taxpayer should have to prove that the loan was eligible for
the interest deduction before he can be exempted from the tax on imputed interest. 35
T.C. at 1090-91 (Fisher, J., concurring; Bruce, J., dissenting).
25. Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23. This ruling was superceded by Rev. Rul.
64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11, in which the IRS said that benefit to the employee will be
recognized in split-dollar insurance agreements.
The Tax Court, in Genshaft v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 282 (1975), found taxable income
to the employee to the extent of the value of insurance protection to the beneficiaries,
and not to the extent of the premium payments made by the employer, as argued by
the IRS. The court thereby evaded the issue of whether it should treat these payments
as interest-free loans.
26. 1955-2 C.B. at 24. Under a "split dollar" insurance plan, the employer usually pays the insurance premium to the extent of the yearly increase in the policy's cash
surrender value, and the money advanced by the employer is secured by the cash value
of the policy. The employee contributes the difference between the actual premium
charge and the cash surrender value increase. Schlifke, supra note 13, at 350-51.
Published by eCommons,
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contrary to this ruling, reliance upon this statement is no longer feasible.
Despite these problems in the Dean decision, no court has held to
the contrary.2" A subsequent tax court memorandum decision has also
refused to attribute income to employees and shareholders on interest29
free open account loans from their corporation.
Recognition of the transfer of the use of property for charitable
purposes as something of economic value provides a further helpful
analogy. Section 170(c)30 specifically allows a deduction for a gift "for
the use of" a charitable organization. There is also a legislative policy
of encouraging charitable contributions." Before the enactment of section 170(f)(3)(a),3 2 which denies a charitible deduction for the contribution of a partial interest in property, courts recognized a
charitable contribution of property when a taxpayer allowed a
3
charitable organization to use his property rent-free. The courts
reasoned that the use of property is "the most essential and beneficial"
of all the rights associated with property, and that the grant of the use
of property is a gift of value."'
Mason v. United States" specifically recognized a benefit where
money was loaned to a charity at an interest rate lower than that which
could have been charged on the open market. The court allowed a
charitable contribution deduction of the difference between the interest that the taxpayer actually charged on the mortgage and the current market interest rate for equivalent mortgages.
Although the use of money is treated as a valuable right for deduction purposes but not necessarily recognized as a valuable right for income purposes, the use of other property is considered an economic
benefit with tax consequences in both areas. The Crown decision noted
27.

Lisle v. Comm'r, 35 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 627 (1976); 38 OHIO ST. L.J. supra

note 13, at 906.
28. Lisle v. Comm'r, 35 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 627 (1976). Tax planners recommend
interest-free loans to provide tax free benefits to employees. See FED. TAX COORDINATOR 2D,

I

H-1756 (1978); Matchinger, Compensating the Executive by Bargain

Purchases, Restricted Stock, Convertible Securities, and Convertible Debentures, 22
MAJOR TAX PLANNING 245, 258-59 (1970).

29. I.R.C. § 170(c).
30. See, e.g., Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis. 1969);
Mattie Fair v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 866 (1957).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(a)(1) (1972) includes rent-free leases in this category.
32. Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965); Passailaigue v. Comm'r,
224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963); Mattie Fair v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 866 (1957);
Priscilla M. Sullivan v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
33. See note 32 supra.
34. 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
35. No. 77-1898, slip op. at 8 n.l1.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/5
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that under the gift tax laws money is considered property.36 Because
the use of property is a valuable property right and under gift tax principles money is property, it logically follows that the use of money is a
valuable property right, and should be subject to the gift tax when that
use is transferred gratuitously.
B. A Transfer of an Interest in Property for Less than Full and
Adequate Consideration is a Gift.
In general, a gift tax will be levied on a transfer for less than
adequate consideration, and this principle encompasses the situation in
which the beneficial use of money is transferred to another who pays
no interest in return.
Gift tax code sections 2501(a)(1)3 7 and 2511(a) define gifts broadly.
Section 2511 (a) states expansively that the gift tax "shall apply whether
the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or
indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible." 3 The regulations accompanying these sections are similarly
broad and all-inclusive. 3 9 Additionally, the committee reports
indicate that Congress intended the gift tax provisions to be applied
36. "A tax ... is hereby imposed ... on the transfer of property by gift ...
any individual . . . ." I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1976).

by

37. I.R.C. § 2511(a).
38. Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1(a)(1), T.D. 7296, 1974-1 C.B. 255, 273, reads in pertinent part: "The tax applies to all transfers by gift of property, wherever situated, by
an individual . ..."

Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1958) reads in pertinent part: "The gift tax applies to a
transfer by way of gift whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is
direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible."
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958) reads in pertinent part: "The gift tax also applies
to gifts indirectly made. Thus, all transactions whereby property or property rights or
interests are gratuitously passed or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or
device employed, constitute gifts subject to tax."
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (1958) reads in pertinent part:
Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential element in the
application of the gift tax to the transfer. The application of the tax is based on
the objective facts of the transfer and the circumstances under which it is made,
rather than on the subjective motives of the donor.
39. The House and Senate reports concerning the gift tax contain the identical
langauge:
The terms "property," "transfer," "gift," and "indirectly" are used in the
broadest and most comprehensive sense; The term "property" reaching every
species of right or interest protected by law and having an exchangeable value.
The words "transfer . . .by gift" and "whether . . . direct or indirect" are

designed to cover and comprehend all transactions (subject to certain express conditions and limitations) whereby, and to the extent... that, property or a property right is donatively passed to or conferred upon another, regardless of the means
or the device employed in its accomplishment.
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 39 (1932) (emphasis added).
Published by eCommons,

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1

sweepingly, and that it intended to include in the term "property"
every species of right or interest protected by law and having exchangeable value."'
Section 2512(b) states that a transfer of property for less than ade4
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth is a gift. ' The
Supreme Court of the United States interpreted this section in Com3
missioner v. Wemyss'" and its companion case, Merrill v. Fahs.' Both
Wemyss and Merrill involved the transfer of assets prior to marriage in
accordance with the provisions of an antenuptial agreement. In
Wemyss, the transfer was made in order to compensate the future
bride for income she would lose by her remarriage, and in Merrill the
transfer was in exchange for the future bride's release of dower rights.
In both cases the Court determined that a gift resulted because there
was a transfer of property for less than full and adequate consideration
in money or money's worth. If the transfer passes this objective test,
45
there is a gift. Donative intent of the transferor is not a requirement.
The Court also emphasized that the term "gift" should be read in the
broadest and most comprehensive sense. 6
The Crown decision concedes that under the gift tax laws money is
considered property.' 7 This property is transferred to the borrower
when a loan is made; the interest paid thereon represents the consideration flowing back to the lender for the use of his property. The
economic reality is that lenders do not transfer the beneficial right to
8
use their money without being compensated.' Adequate consideration
40. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1971) reads in pertinent part: "Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, then
the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration
shall be deemed a gift .. .
41.
42.

324 U.S. 303 (1945).
324 U.S. 308 (1945).

43. In Wemyss, the Court said that the detriment to the donee (loss of income)
did not satisfy the requirement of equal consideration. Id. at 307-08. In Merrill, the
Court determined that the release of dower did not constitute consideration in money
or money's worth. 324 U.S. at 312.
44. This statement by the Court in Wemyss is similar to Treas. Reg. §
25.2511-1(g)(1). See note 37 supra.
45. 324 U.S. at 306.
46. No. 77-1898, slip op. at 8 n.l1.
47. "For the purpose of tax law the word 'interest' is defined as a payment for
the use of money, or compensation for the use of [or] forbearance of money."
Blackmon v. United States, 22 A.F.T.R.2d 5860, 5864 (N.D. Tex. 1968). Accord,
Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Old Colony R.R. v. Comm'r, 284 U.S. 552
(1932); Lloyd v. Comm'r, 154 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 329 U.S. 717 (1946);
Gardner v. United States, 21 A.F.T.R.2d 490 (N.D. Ind. 1968).

48. The dissent in Crown in the Tax Court made the point that the majority, in
holding that an interest-free loan was not a gift, ignored economic reality. "Had the
petitioner [taypayer] in this case arranged for the borrowers to obtain the money from

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/5
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to be paid for the use of money is established by market rates of interest. While the interest rate will fluctuate, there is a range of rates
that is reasonable. Loans which carry interest rates below that range,
or which do not provide for any interest, constitute a transfer of the
beneficial use of money for less than full and adequate consideration.
Under section 2512(b) and cases such as Wemyss, such a transfer is a
gift.
The Johnson and Crown courts did not directly address the
application of the less than full and adequate consideration concept of
section 2512(b). Instead, Crown dwelt on the problem of valuing the
benefit flowing to the debtor in an interest-free demand loan and of
determining the amount of the gift."9 Difficulty of administration of a
Code provision should not be a sufficient reason for ignoring its
enforcement.
Perhaps the real reason for the reliance by Johnson and Crown on
distinctions of form rather than on strenuous statutory and economic
analysis is the court's desire not to become involved in taxing intrafamily loans of money or other property. As the Johnson court
said:
The time has not yet come when a parent must suddenly deal at
arm's length with his children when they finish their education and
start out in life. There is no legal requirement, express or implied,
to charge them interest on money advanced to them at that stage,
whether it be to open a law office and hang out a shingle, to go into the oil business on a substantial scale, or to begin life on their
own in some other way. 50
Similarly, the tax court in Crown said that if the IRS's position were
sustained, "the principle established could be extended to a multitude
of situations involving gratuitous use or sharing of real or personal
property among relatives.""
Johnson may partly have confused gift and income tax questions.
The recognition for gift tax purposes of the benefit flowing from the
parents to the child does not necessarily compel the recognition of an
imputed flow of income in the opposite direction to the parent for income tax purposes. The fact that there is no legal requirement to
charge children interest, and no contractual or statutory obligation to
financial institutions and agreed to pay the interest thereon, clearly, the payment of
such interest would constitute a taxable gift." Crown v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060, 1066
(1977).
49. No. 77-1898, slip op. at 7-8.
50. 254 F. Supp. at 77.
51. 67 T.C. at 1065.
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pay interest, may or may not prevent the imputaton of income to the
parent. It does not change the fact, however, that a valuable property
interest passes to the child for less than full and adequate consideration. For example, there is no legal requirement to charge children the
fair market value of property transferred to them, yet there is clearly a
gift if the child pays less than fair market value for the property."
The critical question is not one of requiring arm's length dealing
between family members. It is the question whether Congress intended
to subject all gratuitous transfers of property and interests in property
to gift taxation.
IV.

FORM OVER SUBSTANCE:

THE FORMAL DISTINCTIONS RAISED BY THE COURTS

Refusing to acknowledge that an interest-free loan is essentially a
- gratuitous transfer of an economic benefit, the courts have emphasized
the technical difficulties of applying a gift tax in this area. Crown
pointed out that the amount of the gift should be determined at the
time of transfer but that the benefit from the use of money under a demand note can only be valued in retrospect by looking at the period
during which the lender did not exercise his right to call the loan. Both
Johnson and Crown were reluctant to impute interest where there was
no legal obligaton to enforce the lender's right to receive such
payments. Both technical difficulties, however, have been overcome in
other areas of federal tax law.
A.

Demand Loans and the Valuation Problem.

Crown left open the possibility that, because of the time value of
money, interest-free term loans are taxable gifts measured by the difference between the present discount value of a term note and its face
value. 3 Demand notes cannot be prospectively valued in terms of the
time value of money because at the time of the loan the borrower does
not know when the loan will be called in. Any current discount from
the face value of a demand note results from the credit rating of the
borrower. If the borrower is financially strong enough to repay the
loan immediately, the fair market value of the note is its face amount.
For gift and estate tax purposes there is a presumption that a note is
worth its face value.' Therefore, absent evidence of a poor credit
rating on the part of the borrower, a demand note is worth its face
value. Even if the note were not worth its face amount, an argument
52.
53.
54.

I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1970); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8, T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627.
No. 77-1898, slip op. at 5 n.7.
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-4, 25.2512-4 (1958).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/5

1979)

COMMENTS

could be made that there is no taxable gift because the claim is for the
face amount.
Crown refused to find a gift in an interest-free demand loan because
it could not be valued at the time of making the loan." The IRS
argued that there was a measurable gift, if not at the time of the loan
at least at the expiration of each gift tax period during which the lender
did not exercise his right to call in the loan.
For demand loans the lender's forbearance from exercising his
legal right to demand repayment of his non-interest bearing note could
be a gift taxable event. The benefit that was passed to the debtor was
the right to use the money for that gift tax period free of charge. 6 A
gift theoretically occurred each day the lender refrained from calling
the loan. It is as if the creditor called up the debtor each day and said,
"I will give you the use of my money today without charge."
Revenue Ruling 73-61 1 sets forth a method of taxing interest-free
demand loans which is consistent with this theory. A gift is made in
each quarter during which the borrower had the use of the funds
without charge. The appropriate time to value the gift is therefore at
the end of each gift tax quarter and not when the loan is made. The
revenue ruling taxes a term loan at the time of making the loan by discounting the note to its present value, and taxes a demand loan at the
end of each quarter during which it remained outstanding.
Crown refused to find a gift taxable property right in a demand
loan because it could be terminated at any time.5 8 A demand loan,
however, may be directly compared to a revocable trust in which the
gift tax is measured after the transfer of the property. A revocable
trust is a gift of property in trust that may be revoked at any time, like
a demand note. The trust principal, because of its uncertain character,
is not considered a completed gift, but the trust income is taxable as a
gift to the beneficiaries in the year it is received. 5 9 Thus, the method of
55. No. 77-1898, slip op. at 8-10.
56. I.R.C. § 2502(b), (c) (1976) sets this taxable period as a calender quarter for
gifts made after 1970, and as a calender year for gifts made before 1971.
57. 1973-1 C.B. 408. The IRS relied upon Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204
(1953), where the Tax Court found a taxable gift when the taxpayer sold some property
to her children in exchange for their promissory note which provided for less than fair
market value interest payments. The gift assessed by the IRS and approved by the
court consisted of the difference between the fair market value interest rate and the
rate actually charged.
58. No. 77-1898, slip op. at 9-10.
59. Id. at 6, citing, inter alia, Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f), T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B.
544.
It has been suggested that the value of the income actually generated by the borrowed funds should be taxed to the lender both as income, and as a gift. Schlifke, note
12 supra. Another commentator suggests treating an interest-free loan as an allocation
of income problem. A parent in the position of lending substantial amounts of money
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taxing gifts as they accrue subsequent to the transfer of property is
already accepted in the gift tax area.
B. Lack of ContractualObligation to Pay is Not a Bar to Imputing
Interest.
Where there is a contractual obligation to pay a debt, and where
the creditor waives the right to collect the debt, there are both income
and gift tax consequences. 6 1 Specific language provides for the inclu-

sion of the forgiveness of indebtedness in gross income in section
62
61(a)(12), which was enacted in response to prior case law. Thus, the
waiver of the contractual right to collect interest income in a business
context results in an income taxable event with the income
accruing to be debtor at the time the creditor relinquishes a legal right.
The same reasoning is applied in the gift tax area. When the obligation to pay a debt is forgiven gratuitously a gift tax is imposed on the
amount of the debt forgiven. Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United

States 3 recognized a gift of the amount of the interest when a father
gratuitiously forgave his son's contractual obligation to pay interest on

a loan. The gift tax here was imposed not when the loan was made, but
when the contractual interest was subsequently forgiven.
The Johnson and Crown courts emphasized the absence of a con6
tractual or statutory obligation to pay interest. The lack of a legal
is usually in a higher tax bracket than his children; therefore, the profit from the
children's use of the money would be taxed at lower rates. These loans could be treated
the same as grantor trusts under sections 671, 673(a), and 676. I.R.C. §§ 671, 673(a),
676. A grantor who creates a revocable trust or a trust that will revert back to the
grantor in ten years or less is taxed directly on the income generated by the trust as well
as being subjected to a gift tax on that income. If an irrevocable trust with a minimum
duration of more than ten years is created, the grantor will not be taxed on the trust income, but a gift tax is imposed at the time the trust is funded; the amount of the gift is
the actuarial value of the term interest of the beneficiary. O'Hare, supra note 13, at
1090-92.
60. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text infra.
61. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716
(1929).
If the forgiveness if indebtedness qualifies as a gift, section 102(a) excludes it from
gross income. Forgiveness of indebtedness is excluded from gross income under section
108, if there is a reduction in the bases of the taxpayer's assets under section 1017.
I.R.C. § 102; I.R.C. §§ 108, 1017 (1976).
62. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Jacobson, 366 U.S. 28 (1948), apparently overruling
Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 28 (1943); U.S. v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284
U.S. 1 (1931); Reynolds v. Boos, 188 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1957); Mervin M. Lippman v.
Comm'r, 52 T.C. 135 (1969); George Hall Corp. v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 146 (1943).
63. 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1975).
64. "The right to interest must arise from an express or implied contractual
obligation or from statute." Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. at 77.
"But absent a contract provision providing otherwise there is no legal obligation
for the borrower to pay interest ..... " Crown v. Comm'r, No. 77-1898, slip op. at 11.
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obligation to pay interest does not, however, defeat IRS attempts to
tax imputed interest in other areas. Sections 48265 and 48366 provide
for imputation of interest even when there is no contractual or
statutory obligtion to pay it.
Section 482 authorizes the IRS to allocate income, deductions,
credits, and allowances among related business entities as necessary
"to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect [their] income." 67 The
regulations promulgated under section 482 impose an arm's length
standard on transactions between elated business entities. In particular, the regulations authorize the imputation of arm's length
interest rates on loans.6 8
Using section 482 as authority, the IRS has attempied to impute interest income to the lending business when interest-free loans are made
to related businesses. The Tax Court has refused to follow the regulations in cases involving such loans where no income was generated
directly out of the transaction. This "tracing doctrine" requires, as a
condition precedent to imputation of interest income under section
482, that the debtor business earn income on the borrowed funds. 69
The IRS has gained support in its struggle against the Tax Court's
tracing doctrine in some federal circuit courts and in the Court of
Claims." The Eighth Circuit, quoted with approval by the Ninth Cir65. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
66. I.R.C. § 483 (1976).
67. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a), T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135. See Kerry Investment
Co. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 479 (1972), modified, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler
Corp. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 496 (1972), rev'd, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); Huber
Homes, Inc. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 598 (1971); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.
928 (1970); Smith-Bridgman & Co. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 287 (1951). The IRS acquiesced in Huber Homes but later said the acquiescence was merely in the proposition that
if interest income is to be imputed, a corresponding deduction must be made. Acq.,
1951-1 C.B. 3, clarified, Rev. Rul. 67-79, 1967-1 C.B. 117.
69. Fitzgerald Motor Co. v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 957 (1973), aff'd on other grounds,
508 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1975); Kerry Inv. Co. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 479 (1972),
modified, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 496 (1972),
rev'd 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973). See generally, Huber Homes, Inc. v. Comm'r, 55
T.C. 598 (1971); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 928 (1970).
It is significant that one of the Tax Court's positions in the section 482 cases is
similar to a position asserted in the Johnson and Crown cases, i.e., transactions that
"only would have produced income" are not taxable events. Huber Homes, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 55 T.C. at 608 (emphasis in original).
70. Liberty Loan Corp. v. United States, 498 F.2d 225 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 419
U.S. 1089 (1974). Aristar, Inc. v. United States, 553 F.2d 644 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Kerry
Inv. Co. v. Comm'r, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. v. Comm'r, 486 F.2d
1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Comm'r, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 934 (1972). But cf., Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Comm'r, 112 F.2d 508
(6th Cir. 1940) (the court refused to impute interest income).
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cuit,"' held that the direct generation of income by the borrowed funds
as required by the Tax Court was unnecessary and was not required by
the Code or the regulations." "The proper standard to be applied in
cases such as this is whether or not the loans . . .would have been
made on an interest free basis in arm's length dealings between uncontrolled taxpayers." 3
This conflict between the Tax Court and some circuit courts over
the appropriate conditions under which to impute interest
demonstrates the confusion that results when there is no clear and explicit congressional guideline. The Tax Court's approach, to require a
showing of actual generation of income, creates complex proof problems and places "a premium on accounting sophistication.""
Interest-free loans do result in the shuffling of income and deductions
between the parent and subsidiary corporations, leading to the distortion of taxable income reported by the business entities involved. The
conflicting views of the courts under section 482 lead to the conclusion
that clear statutory guidelines are of great assistance if the IRS is to impute interest for tax purposes.
Section 483 is similar to section 482 in that it provides for imputation of interest income. While section 482 is a general allocation section with the imputation of interest provided in the accompanying
regulations, 5 section 483 specifically permits imputation of interest in
the case of installment sales which carry no interest, or less than a
designated rate of interest. 6 Prior to the enactment of section 483, taxpayers could obtain capital gains treatment on what would otherwise
be taxed as ordinary income by including the interest charge in the
price of the property sold." Section 483 represents a specific legislative
response to an area where tax avoidance was previously possible.,
71. Kerry Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 500 F.2d at 110 (quoting Kahler Corp. v.
Comm'r, 486 F.2d at 5).
72. Fitzgerald Motor Co. v. Comm'r, 508 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1975). See Kerry
Inv. Co. v. Comm'r, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. v. Comm'r, 486 F.2d
1 (8th Cir. 1973); B. Forman Co. v. Comm'r, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972).
73. Kahler Corp., 486 F.2d at 5. The parent corporation could borrow at a lower
interest rate than the subsidiary, and was able to take advantage of an interest deduction, while the subsidiary could not benefit from a deduction because it had little income. In Liberty Loan and Aristar, the parent companies, in the consumer finance
business, borrowed money at low interest rates, and loaned this money to their subsidiaries, who in turn loaned this money to customers at a higher rate.
74. Kerry Investment Corp., 58 T.C. at 495. (Featherston, J., dissenting).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2, 1976-1 C.B. 135.
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(c), (d), T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135.
77. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted in (19641 U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1380; S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 102,.reprinted
in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1673, 1774.

78.

Both the House and Senate reports on section 224 of the Revenue Act of 1964
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Sections 482 and 483 are income tax provisions, but their enactment and application indicate the general purpose of Congress to treat
transactions according to the underlying economic realities and to prevent mere distinctions of form from being used to evade taxes. The
analogy to gift taxation is clear. The economic benefit flowing to the
borrower is the same for an interest-free loan whether the money is
lent with a ninety-day note with a contractual obligation to pay interest
which is forgiven, or with a demand note which is not called in for
ninety days, or with a ninety-day term note. In each case there is a gift
of the use of money for ninety days. Nevertheless, the first situation
would be a gift under Republic Petroleum,7 the second would not be a
gift under Johnson and Crown, S" and whether the third would be a gift
was specifically left undecided by Crown.8 '
The courts only recognize an economic benefit selectively, generally when there is an obligation to pay interest created by the parties to
the transaction or by statute. Therefore, as in the cases of installment
sales and loans between related business entities, a legislative provision
may be the best solution to the problem of tax avoidance through the
use of interest-free loans.
V.

PROPOSAL

The clearest legislative response to the courts' refusal to hold that
interest-free loans between family members are gifts would be the
enactment of specific statutory langauge addressing this problem. A
'Code provision is superior to a treasury regulation because a clear
expression of Congress' intent would prevent contrary holdings similar
to those which exist under section 482. The provision should provide
that an interest-free loan is a gift taxable event, and that the amount of
the gift is the interest forgone by the lender, computed at a rate
established in treasury regulations promulgated under authority of the
provision. The regulations should be similar to those under section
483, providing for a "safe harbor" rate of interest S" and setting the interest rate to be used in computing the amount of the gift when the interest rate charged is less than the "safe harbor" rate.
(now I.R.C. § 483) felt section 483 was closing a serious tax loophole. Prior to section
483, similarly situated taxpayers would be treated differently based on the form of the
installment sale. Id.
79. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(c), T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135. Code section 6621 also
provides a scheme for determining interest rates through regulations. I.R.C. § 6621
(1976).
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The approach taken in Revenue Ruling 73-61,11 establishing a
logical system of taxing interest-free loans, should provide a model for
the new provision's regulations for purposes of valuing the gift in both
demand and term loans. A term loan would be taxed at the time of
making the loan by discounting the face amount to present value,
while a demand loan would be taxed at the end of each calendar
quarter during which it was outstanding.
Gifts resulting from the imputation of interest on an interest-free
loan would be eligible for the $3,000 per donee exclusion provided in
section 2503(b). 4 The per donee exclusion would prevent the gift taxation of small loans and avoid the attendant administrative burdens. To
generate a $3,000 gift of imputed interest at 60 simple interest would
5
require the use of $50,000 for one year without charge."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The courts' reluctance to interfere in family arrangements is
blinding them to the reality that the use of property is a property interest which, when transferred, confers a substantial benefit upon the
recipient. If the transfer is made gratuitously, it bears all of the
characteristics of a taxable gift. The courts base their decisions on the
adminstrative difficulties of dealing with the different forms that
interest-free loans may take, and ignore the substance of the transfer.
Whether the loan was made for a specified or indefinite period, and
whether the parties agreed to interest and subsequently changed their
minds or never agreed to interest at all, the ultimate economic benefit
to the borrower is the same.
In Crown and Johnson the income from property was transferred
free of gift tax. Because it appears that interest-free loans will not be
-subjected to taxation by the courts, a legislative enactment authorizing
the imputation of interest may be necessary to prevent further evasion
of federal taxes by the use of interest-free loans.
Victoria Wilson
Thomas M. Poulton
83. 1973-1 C.B. 408. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
84. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1970).
85. This assumes that no prior gifts had been made to the particular donee that
year. If prior gifts had been made, only a portion, or perhaps none of the $3,000 per
donee exclusion would be available to use against the gift of imputed interest.
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